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 Naval Combat Logistics Support System
 DAVID SCHRADY and DAVID WADSWORTH
 Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
 The subject matter is the sustainability of naval forces in combat and the intimate relationships between
 tactics and logistics. The observation is made that it has been a long time since the United States Navy
 has worried about logistics in combat and that to some extent combat logistics have become 'somebody
 else's' responsibility. It is argued that combat logistics is inescapably the force commander's responsibility
 and its dimensions are sketched. Necessarily, the amount of data and calculation is extensive if an
 accurate picture of the combat logistics states of the force are to be maintained and predictions of future
 states are to be made. It is in the predictions of future states that the interactions between tactics and
 logistics become most apparent. The data storage and retrieval and computational aspects suggest a
 microprocessor-based support system. BGLCSS (battle group logistics co-ordinator support system) is
 a program of combat logistics data, event routines, and algorithms designed to allow the logistics
 co-ordinator to track and predict force combat logistics states and provide timely and meaningful insight
 to the force commander.
 Key words: defence studies, naval logistics, modelling, prediction, decision aid
 BACKGROUND
 Combat logistics is defined here as involving those activities undertaken to sustain a battle group
 sailing in harm's way. It is not a set of activities that have been a serious part of the training
 conducted ashore, in fleet exercises, or in the operations of deployed battle groups, though this is
 changing. These activities were last practised in World War II. Of course, the U.S. Navy has been
 continuously deployed around the world, fought in Korea and South-East Asia, and responded to
 over 200 crises on behalf of the United States in the intervening years. Obviously the logistics
 capabilities which have supported this level of operations are considerable (most recently in the
 Gulf War where 6 carrier battle groups, 2 battleships, 31 amphibious-warfare ships and more were
 supported during combat and for months prior to the outbreak of hostilities). However World War
 II was the last time the Fleet was in combat with a competent enemy and, with the exceptions of
 Korea and South-East Asia, there has been little expenditure of ordnance. Logistics has largely
 become a matter of supplying fuel, mail, movies and the spare parts which keep ship and aircraft
 systems operational.
 Changes in strategic thinking at the start of the last decade and Royal Navy experience in the
 Falklands War have led to increasing awareness of logistics in sustaining combat power at sea.
 Logistics is getting more attention in war games, though the games by and large were constructed
 without provision for logistics and logistics has to be played off-line. Fleet exercises are starting
 to recognize combat logistics, but the realistic treatment of logistics is normally sacrificed in
 consideration of other training objectives. When combat logistics are not dealt with realistically,
 the real and important interactions between tactics and logistics are masked. During the hostilities
 phase of an exercise, ships do defend against attack and, in an exercise sense, they do deplete their
 magazines. Normally they are 'constructively' rearmed. The constructive rearming is mythical and
 takes no time, nor does it require the movement of the combatant or the combat logistics ship. This
 conserves the limited training time available, but hides the tactical decisions that in reality would
 have to be made. In the authors' view, combat logistics needs to be practised every bit as much as
 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW), etc.
 The views contained herein are those of the authors and are not to be construed as reflecting the views of the U.S.
 Department of the Navy or the U.S. Department of Defense.
 Correspondence: David Schrady, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
 U.S.A.
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 COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN LOGISTICS
 The battle group commander must plan for the logistics sustainability of his force and determine
 the number of combat logistics ships and shuttle ships required. These are influenced by the area
 of his operations, the availability of advance logistics support bases, transit distances, and the
 likelihood of enemy interdiction. He must know, as he does indeed, the offensive and defensive
 capabilities of each ship in his force and plan their disposition. He must know the fuel and ordnance
 capacities of each unit, including combat logistics ships, and their fuel and ordnance states as they
 join the battle force, and he must track the fuel and ordnance states throughout the deployment.
 He must plan his speed of advance and formation, taking into account under-way replenishments
 in transit and individual unit fuel consumption rates. He must specify the replenishment tactic
 (delivery boy, gas station or combination), balancing the defensive posture of the formation against
 the vulnerability of the combat logistics ships and/or the need to use screen units to escort the
 logistics ships during replenishments.
 The commander must know which offensive and defensive sensors and weapon systems are
 degraded or are inoperable on individual units while replenishing. He must decide if he will
 reposition units to cover for the defensive capabilities temporarily off-station for replenishment,
 or to substitute aircraft to cover open stations. In planning replenishments he must take into
 account the battle force plan of intended movement, sea state and direction of the seas. In doing
 these things he must have determined the most serious threat during the period and the most likely
 threat axis or axes.
 Upon completing the transit phase and entering a high-threat area, he must have brought all his
 forces to a state of maximum logistics sustainability. Following an engagement, he must decide how
 best to rearm and perhaps refuel his combatants in the unknown time before the next engagement.
 In doing this he must consider vertical replenishment as well as connected replenishment, the
 difficulty of replenishing some types of ordnance and his combatants' needs for ordnance and fuel,
 as well as his requirements for maintaining a viable defensive posture and the possibility of having
 to swap stations of ships with depleted magazines for those with higher ordnance stocks. By this
 time it is possible that battle damage or attrition will complicate these decisions.
 The list of things the commander must plan, decide, direct and execute logistically is longer,
 but the above is enough to sketch the picture. Combat logistics will be the concern of the force
 commander and these issues cannot be delegated because of the level and seriousness of the
 interactions between logistics and tactical decisions. For the line officers, who have avoided the
 'L-word', it is instructive to appreciate the extent of the involvement of Admirals Chester Nimitz
 and Arleigh Burke in combat logistics throughout their careers.
 While combat logistics has always been a critical activity, it would seem to be more challenging
 now than in World War II. Global surveillance systems imply that denying the enemy knowledge
 of your position is indeed difficult. Naval warfare is now a multi-threat environment requiring
 defence in depth and dispersed formations. Overseas facilities which could serve as advanced
 logistic support bases have been and are diminishing alarmingly. The final reason stems from
 modern, high-tech weapons. Their cost dictates limited inventories in peacetime and studies have
 indicated that the production surge capability for such weapons during hostilities is poor.' This
 suggests what Brinkerhoff2 has termed resource-constrained combat, with the need to control
 ordnance and missile expenditures. As he points out: 'Running out of ordnance is an absolute
 combat stopper.
 COMBAT LOGISTICS SUPPORT SYSTEM
 The word logistic comes from the Greek word XoytrtKOS, meaning skilled in calculation. Further,
 the dictionary defines logistics as the branch of military science having to do with moving,
 supplying and quartering troops. Together these definitions imply that logistics involves the care
 and feeding of combat forces and is supported by significant calculations. The data storage,
 retrieval and computational aspects of the commander's problems described above suggest a
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 microprocessor-based support system. Microprocessors have been at sea for some years now,
 generally hosting a variety of tactical decision aids. There is only pencil and paper for combat
 logistics. The decision aids are largely unused as such, and the authors philosophically would rather
 support the decision-maker than prescribe decisions. Hence the development of BGLCSS, or battle
 group logistics co-ordinator support system.
 BGLCSS is a program of combat logistics commodities (fuels and ordnance only) data, event
 routines and algorithms designed to support the planning, tracking and prediction of combat
 logistics states and provide timely and meaningful insight to the commander. To be useful to the
 tactical commander, the combat logistics support system must be able to predict future logistics
 states for individual ships as a function of planned or likely actions. If the system can predict future
 states then logically it can also be used to estimate current consumption and states based on
 activities (steaming, flight operations, strikes, raids, ASW prosecutions, etc.) that have been or are
 going on. It is asserted that, to a very useful approximation, all consumption can be estimated to
 provide a running status of the combat logistics posture of each ship. Unit reports, when available,
 can of course be used to update the estimates. The support system additionally provides 'logistics
 dead reckoning' during strict EMCON (emissions control) or whenever communication with
 individual units is not possible or desirable.
 In structuring BGLCSS, it was realized that with regard to fuel and ordnance, consumption
 would be dictated by either the passage of time or the occurrence of specific events. Ship propulsion
 fuel use, part of aircraft fuel use and a minor amount of ordnance use can be predicted based on
 the passage of time. The balance of aircraft fuel and ordnance use are dictated by events such as
 raids against the force or strikes by the battle group. Ship fuel consumption is estimated from
 analytic expressions for each ship class, which relate consumption in thousands of gallons per hour
 to the ship's speed. Aviation fuel use is estimated from models of flying posture as a function of
 the threat level (aircraft fuel use based on the passage of time) and models of flying posture
 associated with specific events. Flying posture is meant to be the specification of the air wing
 composition on the carrier and ASW helicopters on the surface combatants, the expected numbers
 of sorties per day of each aircraft type in low-, medium- and high-threat areas and in each specific
 event. When these are combined with gallons per sortie for each aircraft type the required estimates
 of aviation fuel usage are obtained.
 Estimates of ordnance consumption, primarily associated with events, are the most critical and
 most contentious. The warrior understands in a general way both fuel and ordnance use, but what
 he cares about is ordnance expenditure. Ordnance use estimates, planning factors, are logically the
 output of accurate and robust models of the engagement of multiple threats by a formation of ships
 and aircraft. Such models were beyond the scope of the authors' efforts, so ordnance usage
 planning factors were sought from other sources. There are few such sources, and comparisons
 were made where possible across sources. There were detail differences but no order-of-magnitude
 differences.
 Additional data requirements were, for each ship class, fuel and ordnance capacities, ordnance
 load-outs, fuel and ordnance transfer and receive rates, estimates of times for underway replenish-
 ment approach and rig times, and more.
 SHIP FUEL USAGE ESTIMATION
 There is not much that can be said in this forum about most of the data, but the estimation of
 ship fuel consumption can be discussed further. The conventional wisdom was that ship fuel
 consumption is a cubic function of speed, at least for moderate and higher speeds. Unclassified
 data, speed and fuel consumption (gallons per hour) pairs, exist for all ship classes. There are a
 number of ways a function might be fitted to the data. Third-order polynomial regression was
 initially chosen as suggested in the literature.3 If fuel consumption F is of the form
 F = c0+ cl V+c2V2 +c3 V3, (1)
 where Vis ship velocity. Of course, the predictor variables, speed, speed squared and speed cubed,
 are highly correlated, but the only objective was to find a function which fitted the data well. The
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 FIG. 1. Regression on fuel use-speeed data for a steam-turbine-po wered class of cruiser. Key: * -actual, + -predicted.
 third-order polynomial regressions worked well enough in terms of r-squared values and residuals;
 see Figure 1, which shows the data and regression for a class of steam-turbine-powered cruisers.
 The regression equation is
 F=-10 932 + 1842.6 V- 97.15V + 1.779V (2)
 and the r-squared value is 0.998. However, a problem exists in the sense that if these functions
 were used to predict low speed fuel consumption then the predicted fuel consumption at 5- knots
 was sometimes found to be greater than that at 15 knots, i.e. there was negative fuel consump-
 tion at low speeds. Note that the co coefficient in equation (2) is negative, meaning that at zero
 speed, moored to the pier, the ship is making a considerable quantity of fuel each hour! If
 the regression equation for the cruiser is used to predict fuel consumption for speeds below the
 lowest speed represented in the data (14 knots) then the result is as shown in Figure 2. Prediction
 of negative fuel consumption at the operationally important'speed of 10 knots is not terribly
 helpful.
 Investigation into the literature of ship resistance and powering provided additional insights.
 The relationship between a ship's fuel consumption and its speed is represented in Figure 3.
 At any given speed, effective horsepower (EHP) must equal total resistance. The total resistance
 generated by a ship moving through the water has two principal components: friction resistance
 and wave-making resistance. At slow speeds friction resistance dominates, but at higher speeds
 wave-making resistance dominates and increases very rapidly as full speed is approached. The
 relationship between ship speed and EHP was determined in 1876 by William Froude 4 working
 at Torquay with the towing tank he built with a grant of ?-2000 from the Admiralty. His formula
 ~~~ 4- ~ ~ 94
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 FIG. 2. Regression prediction of fuel use over the entire speed range. Key: *--actual; + -predicted.
 where
 CT = coefficient of total resistance,
 p = fluid density in slugs per ft3,
 S = wetted hull area in ft2 9
 550 = one horsepower in foot-pounds per second,
 V = velocity in feet per second.
 Thus we have it on good authority that EHP is a cubic function of speed (V3). Let us refer
 again to Figure 3. It is assumed in current practice that EHP is a constant fraction of brake
 horsepower (BHP); see pUCCi.5 The ultimate relationship between fuel input and ship speed is then
 cubic in speed, but further depends on the relationship between fuel consumption and BHP
 Fuel
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 produced by the prime mover. Depending upon the form of this latter relationship, the relationship
 between fuel consumption and ship speed could be more or less than cubic and certainly need not
 be an integer power.
 After extensive review of the applicable literature and discussions with mechanical and naval
 engineers, it was determined that there exists no single theoretical model of fuel consumption as
 a function of power output. The relationship is always specific to (1) the type of prime mover (steam
 turbine, gas turbine, diesel), (2) the particular prime mover in question (manufacturer, size, specific
 characteristics) and (3) how the prime mover is actually operated in its application. From published
 data on a variety of prime movers of all three types, functions of the form
 F = bo + b, [BHP ] b2 (4)
 were fitted very satisfactorily. If this is the form of the relationship between fuel consumption and
 power output by the prime mover, then the ultimate relationship between fuel consumption and
 ship speed is a 'power function' of the form
 F = po + Pi VP2 (5)
 In application, the coefficients are determined by regression performed on ship-class-speed-fuel-
 use data, and non-integer values of the power coefficient P2 are the norm. The power functions
 yield excellent ship fuel use predictions and behave sensibly over the entire speed range from zero
 to maximum speed. Note that there is no theoretical support for a cubic polynomial model, and
 it is the linear and quadratic terms of these equations that give rise to the low-speed behaviour
 problems.
 THE SUPPORT SYSTEM PROGRAM
 The BGLCSS program was designed to run on the IBM PC-AT compatible computers which are
 relatively plentiful throughout U.S. Navy ships. The program was written in Borland Interna-
 tional's Turbo Pascal 6.0 and heavily utilizes library routines from Turbo Power Software's Object
 Professional. This choice of programming language allows for easy modification and maintenance
 of the system. This feature became very important during the evaluation period discussed below.
 The design goals were to provide an easy-to-use system that would be responsive, maintainable and
 easily modifiable. Structurally, the program is an event-step simulation using several external data
 files. The data files provide the operator with a quick means of changing or updating the many
 planning factors. The program is menu-driven and many of the features can be customized by the
 user through option selections. The program is divided into sections that logically lead the operator
 from initial configuration of the battle group database to the generation of predictions of logistics
 states for individual units and the battle group as a whole. See Figure 4 for a conceptual view of
 program inputs, processes and outputs. The operator identifies the ships to be included in the battle
 group and then can initialize their capacities, on-hand quantities and ordnance loads. The initial
 set of events are entered and the user can then display logistics status and predictions. As new
 information concerning battle group operations or individual ship status becomes available, the
 operator can easily enter any new data or modify existing data and generate a new status report
 and set of predictions. Thus BGLCSS can be used to track the logistics status of the battle group
 and its component units in close to real time, as well as allowing for predictions of future status
 and 'what if' exercises.
 While BGLCSS has the structure of a simulation, it is not a simulation in the Monte Carlo sense.
 Nothing is random and all calculations and projections are based on the models and planning
 factors used, the conditions set by the operator, the passage of time and the events entered into
 the event file.
 EVALUATION
 During the last year the authors have had the opportunity to evaluate BGLCSS in two major fleet
 exercises. The first exercise involved more than 20 ships of many classes. During the first 8 days
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 at sea we were able to adapt our prior, more simplistic view of the exercise to the realities, and to
 verify that the tracking and prediction of fuels usage was working very acceptably. Each evening
 BGLCSS predictions were made of what the next 2 days' fuels reports from each ship would
 indicate. When the operational message reports were subsequently received from each ship, their
 actual fuels use was compared with the predictions. Differences between actual fuels states and
 what was predicted were generally very small and maximum errors were also quite small.
 The exercise culminates in the so-called hostilities phase when 'orange' forces attack and are
 attacked by the 'blue' forces. It is during the hostilities phase that the prediction of ordnance
 expenditures, the most crucial part of the evaluation of BGLCSS, would be made. When the
 hostilities phase began, everyone knew that among the tens of ordnance types there was one type
 that was most interesting and most critical. The initial voice reports of the usage of this ordnance
 type indicated that the predictions by BGLCSS and the reported usage differed by almost a factor
 of three. This was completely unsatisfactory. For nearly 24 hours there was gloom and consterna-
 tion, and discussion of arbitrarily changing the ordnance use planning factors (which was not
 done). Then the message reports were received. Some ships have automatic recording of their actual
 engagements. These reports indicated that their actual expenditures of the critical ordnance type
 differed from their early voice reports of usage by nearly a factor of three. Confidence in BGLCSS
 was restored and all predicted ordnance usage, not just the one important type of ordnance, was
 treated with great respect. In this first exercise, the objective was evaluation of the support system
 which was operated by the authors.
 In the second exercise, the goal was to have the system used by the embarked fleet logistics
 co-ordinator; that is, used on-line and for real by the persons with the operational responsibility.
 The authors supported the fleet logistics co-ordinator in his use of the system. While the system
 was designed for a single-carrier battle group, the exercise involved a two-carrier battle force and
 the system proved capable of handling the larger force. Because it was being used by those with
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 the operational responsibility, the systems tracking and predictions were being briefed to the fleet
 commander daily. The admiral was seeing information he had never previously had available and,
 in his nightly calls to his two battle group commanders, he began quoting the predicted ordnance
 states of their forces to them and asking what they intended to do in light of this information.
 Ultimately, both battle group commanders made tactical decisions that were dictated by their
 logistics situations. The fleet logistics co-ordinator stated that the system 'was a breakthrough in
 allowing the fleet commander to aggressively pursue tactical logistics'. The fleet commander stated
 that his logistics coordinator 'set a standard in logistic support planning and execution that has
 enhanced not only fleet exercises but also battle group operations'.
 CONCLUSIONS
 BGLCSS went to sea and was basically quite successful. It offered an alternative to pencil and
 paper. The latter suffered two fatal problems. First, the situation is far too complex and requires
 too much data to ever be adequately handled manually. Second, with pencil and paper, the best
 anyone could do was to track past fuel and ordnance expenditures. When the best the logistics
 coordinator could tell the admiral was what happened two days ago, and could never tell the
 admiral about his sustainability 1, 2 or 3 days hence, it was no wonder that the commander was
 not terribly interested in what the logisticians had to say.
 The problem proved tractable in a microprocessor-based support system. The program proved
 to be easily modified. A number of changes were made at sea during the first exercise, and more
 changes were made at home between the first and second exercises. The fleet commander had
 recognized the need for the kinds of information BGLCSS provides and was very receptive when
 the information was provided. In the second exercise the interplay between tactics and logistics was
 demonstrated and resulted in, in the opinion of the authors, more realistic training. As both carrier
 battle groups were in the exercise as part of their workup for deployment to the Persian Gulf in
 late December 1990, this was perhaps significant.
 The interaction between logistics and tactics will continue to be an issue for the foreseeable
 future; in fact, in a climate of reduced resources and changing threats, logistics becomes even more
 important. For a commander to be able to incorporate logistics considerations into his tactical
 planning, he must have current (and future, if possible) information about his logistics state. This
 is an area where operational researchers can continue to make significant contributions to war-
 fighting efforts.
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